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Introduction 1 
Both response briefs assert that Judge Harris, in granting UDOT' s motion 
for clarification, treated it as a motion for reconsideration of a summary 
judgment motion denied by Judge Kennedy. (UDOT Resp. Br. at 40; Clyde-
Geneva Resp. Br. at 28.) If Judge Harris reconsidered the prior summary 
judgment motion, then Judge Harris not only failed to consider the evidence 
provided in response to the summary judgment motion, but also lacked the 
authority to revisit Judge Kennedy's ruling under the coordinate judge rule. Each 
error provides an independent ground to reverse the dismissal of Build' s claims. 
First, Judge Harris erred by ignoring ( or weighing) the evidence on 
summary judgement when he ruled that Build provided no evidence that the 
UDOT engineer-Rex Harrison-believed that the work requested by UDOT was 
outside the scope of the contract. Mr. Harrison's belief is a dispositive fact under 
Meadow Valley Contractors v. UDOT, 2011 UT 35, 266 P.3d 671, which held that a 
contractor must provide UDOT written notice of an "alleged change" if UDOT' s 
engineer believed the requested work to be outside the scope of the contract. 
Judge Harris incorrectly dismissed Build's claim under Meadow Valley on 
the ground that Build provided no evidence to contradict UDOT' s evidence that 
Mr. Harrison did not believe the work to be outside the scope of the contract. But 
1 For simplicity, Build refers to both UDOT and Clyde-Geneva as "UDOT." 
Because the two response briefs are substantially similar in many sections, this 
reply will cite to UDOT' s response unless responding to an argument found 
solely in Clyde-Geneva's brief. 
1 
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in Meadow Valley, the parties did not dispute that the engineer believed that the 
work he ordered was within the scope of the contract. Here, there is evidence 
that Mr. Harrison knew that the work was outside the scope of Build' s contract, 
thus creating a disputed issue of material fact. That evidence was before Judge 
Kennedy on the first motion for summary judgment. Ignoring or discounting 
that evidence is inappropriate on summary judgment. On this basis alone, Judge 
Harris erred in dismissing Build' s claims. 
Second, Judge Harris' s ruling also violates the coordinate judge rule. 
UDOT argues that either the coordinate judge rule does not apply to an 
interlocutory order, or, if it does, Judge Harris's ruling falls into an exception to 
that rule because it corrects an error made by Judge Kennedy's application of 
Meadow Valley. Neither argument is preserved and both arguments fail on their 
merits. Neither Mid-America nor McLaughlin purports to overrule, or narrow, the 
coordinate judge rule articulated in Sittner. In fact, the Utah Supreme Court's 
most recent pronouncement on the topic cites Sittner' s articulation of the 
coordinate judge rule- i.e., that a judge may not reverse an order of a previous, 
equivalent-ranking judge in the same case. USA Power, LLC v. Pacificorp, 2016 UT 
20,372 P.3d 629. And UDOT's assertion that Judge Harris was "correcting" 
Judge Kennedy's application of Meadow Valley fails because Judge Harris 
expressed doubt at the hearing that Judge Kennedy had erred. The coordinate 
judge rule is the current law in Utah and applies to Judge Harris' s ruling. 
2 
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finally, Judge Harris also erred when he dismissed Build' s claim for 
consequential damages sua sponte. On appeal, UDOT argues that Judge Harris 
correctly dismissed Build' s claims because Build could not prove the amount of 
its consequential damages. But the court could not dismiss claims without a 
dispositive motion. The court granted UDOT' s motions in limine to exclude the 
testimony of two of Build' s witnesses on a type of consequential damages, i.e., 
business devastation. Motions in limine exclude evidence, but are not dipositive 
motions. Build did not-but would have in response to a dispositive motion-
provide the trial court with other evidence of consequential damages, such as 
other evidence of business valuation or of attorney fees. UDOT also argues that 
Build's claims for attorney fees are not preserved, despite UDOT's mention of 
· attorney fees in its summary judgment papers and the fact that Build did not 
have the opportunity to provide evidence of additional consequential damages. 
The trial court failed to consider the evidence provided in opposition to a 
motion for summary judgment in reconsidering the denial of that same motion. 
The court also lacked authority to reconsider the denial of the motion for 
summary judgment under the coordinate judge rule. Finally, the trial court erred 
in dismissing Build' s claim for consequential damages after granting a motion in 
limine directed at some of Build' s evidence of consequential damages. This court 
should reverse. 
3 
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Argument 
Judge Harris's order granting summary judgment for UDOT and 
dismissing Build' s consequential damages claim was flawed for three reasons, 
any of which requires reversal and remand. first, Judge Harris ignored or 
weighed conflicting evidence-both inappropriate on summary judgment-to 
rule that Build had not provided any evidence of a key disputed fact. Second, 
Judge Harris violated the coordinate judge rule, which, contrary to UDOT's 
assertions, remains good law and was recently cited by the Utah Supreme Court. 
Judge Harris did not identify any error of Judge Kennedy that would have 
warranted an exception to the coordinate judge rule. Third, even if Judge Harris 
had the discretion to dismiss Build's consequential damages claims sua sponte, he 
cannot do so on the grounds that Build lacks evidence of consequential damages 
before Build has been given the opportunity to present the jury with evidence of 
consequential damages, such as attorney fees. 
1. Judge Harris Erred By Ignoring Or Weighing Evidence On a Material 
Disputed Fact Where Judge Kennedy Had Already Ruled That Summary 
Judgment Was Not Appropriate 
UDOT asserts that Judge Harris properly dismissed Build' s claims because 
there was no disputed material fact and the change in work was not extra work 
as a matter of law. Judge Harris found, and UDOT agrees, that Build presented 
no evidence that Mr. Harrison "made a 'knowing and deliberate' change" when 
he ordered Build to haul excess waste offsite. (UDOT Resp. Br. at 50-51; 
4 
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v.ib 
R.15785;.) UDOT also asserts that, as a matter of law, Mr. Harrison's belief that no 
change to the contract occurred is legally correct. (UDOT Resp. Br. at 54.) Both 
assertions are incorrect. 
There are two mutually-exclusive sections of the contract at issue here, as 
in Meadow Valley. Which one applies turns on whether the engineer, at the time 
he ordered the work to be performed, believed the work to be outside the scope 
of the contract. Meadow Valley, 2011 UT 35, ,r 32 (Mr. Squire's (the engineer) belief 
that a change altered the contract was key fact). The "Differing Site Conditions, 
Changes, and Extra Work provision" (Section 1.5 here) is triggered when the 
engineer believes the work to be within the scope of the contract at the time of the 
change and the contractor disagrees, giving rise to the "alleged change" dispute 
and the requirement that the contractor provide written notice to UDOT. On the 
other hand, the "Significant Changes in the Character of Work" provision 
(Section 1.6 here) is triggered when the engineer believes the work is outside the 
scope of the contract at the time of the change, or, in the language of Meadow Valley, 
the change is "knowing and deliberate" on the part of the UDOT engineer. Id. 
Under that provision, it is the engineer who must provide the written notice of 
the change, not the contractor. 
UDOT argues that the change at issue here is an "alleged change" and 
therefore Section 1.5 applies as matter of law. This argument is based on two 
erroneous assertions: (i) Build provided no evidence that Rex Harrison believed 
5 
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that the work ordered was outside the scope of the contract; and (ii) the change 
is, as a matter of law, within the scope of the contract. Build addresses each 
assertion in turn. 
1.1 Build provided evidence of a disputed fact which was considered 
by Judge Kennedy when he denied summary judgment and is 
sufficient to defeat summary judgment under Utah law 
All parties agree that what Rex Harrison believed the contract required at 
the time that he ordered Build to haul the waste off-site is a material fact. (UDOT 
Resp. Br. at 51-52.) UDOT is challenging whether the dispute about this fact is 
genuin~ and characterizes Build's argument regarding Mr. Harrison's belief as 
"brash conjecture" or 11speculation and surmise."(UDOT Resp. Br. at 53-54.) In 
support of this characterization, UDOT cites not evidence, but two federal 
opinions from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit that were 
decided under federal rule 56. 
UDOT does not cite any Utah authority for what constitutes a genuine 
dispute of material fact. The Utah Supreme Court has held that the applicable 
standard under federal rule 56 is different from Utah's rule 56 on this exact point. 
Federal law, stemnting from the Celotex trilogy, shifts the burden of establishing 
a genuine dispute of material fact to the norunovant if the moving party 
demonstrates that 11there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving 
party's case." J. Geils Band Employee Ben. Plan v. Smith Barney Shearson, Inc., 76 
F.3d 1245, 1251 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,325 
6 
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(1986)). This is not Utah law. The Utah Supreme Court expressly rejected the 
Celotex reasorung and "does not allow a summary judgment movant to merely 
point out a lack of evidence in the nonmoving party's case, but instead requires a 
movant to affirmatively provide factual evidence establishing that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ,r 16, 177 P.3d 600. 
UDOT asserts, as it did below, that Mr. Harrison's belief that the "off-site 
disposal of material was not a change" to the contract is an "undisputed fact." 
(UDOT Resp. Br. at 53; R.11632,14672.) And as it did below, UDOT provides no 
evidence in support of its assertion that the fact is not disputed, but only cites 
Rex Harrison's testimony as definitive. (UDOT Resp. Br. at 53; R.14664.) In fact, 
Build provided the following evidence showing the dispute:· 
• Language in the contract indicating that "[£]ill slopes may be 
flattened as shown on plans in order to waste excess 
material." (R. 1285, 3114, 3117 (Op. Br. at Add. C).) 
• Language in the contract indicating how much excavated 
material would be disposed of at various locations within the 
project site. (R. 1331 (Op. Br. at Add. D).) 
• Mr. Harrison's testimony that "the contractor was allowed to 
dispose of excavated material in waste areas" within the 
project site. (R. 13714, 3504 (Op. Br. at Add. E).) 
• A change order, completed by UDOT during the project, 
indicating that part of the project "is constructed on an 
unstable historic land slide" and detailing the "corrective 
action" taken to "improve its stability per Geotechnical 
Engineers['] recommendations." (R. 7743 (Op. Br. at Add. F).) 
• Mr. Harrison's testimony that he instructed Build to haul the 
excess clay offsite based upon an exercise of his "personal 
engineering judgment, along with our geotechnical 
7 
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recommendations" after becoming "aware of subsurface 
movement in that particular slide area." (R. 3456, 3511-12 (Op. 
Br. at Add. E).) 
• A letter from Mr. Harrison, acknowledging that a 
"change•" ... [w]as the basis of [Build's] claim in that 
[excavated material] could no longer be effectively disposed 
of within the contract limits." (R. 3456-57, 3530 (Op. Br. at 
Add. G.) 
In addition to Build's evidence disputing this key fact, Judge Kennedy 
ruled that UDOT's claims were "subject to questions of fact" on several issues-
all of which turn on this key fact. (R.9837.) Judge Harris either had to ignore or 
improperly discount Build' s evidence to reach the opposite result. 
1.2 Whether the work ordered by Rex Harrison was within the scope 
of the contract is a question of fact, not a matter of law 
UDOT' s second, somewhat confusing, assertion is that "Harrison's belief 
that no change occurred is legally, as well as factually established." (UDOT Resp. 
Br. at 54.) 2 UDOT then cites to "Specification 02231, Part 3.4" of the contract and 
2 Even more confusing is UDOT' s authority for this argument. Citing 30-year-
old federal Court of Claims opinions, UDOT presents the elements of a "changed 
condition" claim, which it then says Build fails to meet. (UDOT Resp. Br. at 54-
56.) The two opinions relied upon by UDOT are federal opinions dealing with a 
specific factual circumstance where a contractor relies on incorrect plans or 
specifications and so seeks an equitable adjustment. Weeks Dredging & 
Contracting, Inc. v. U.S., 13 Cl. Ct. 193,218 (1987) (establishing the "six 
indispensable elements" for an equitable adjustment based on material difference 
between subsurface conditions described in the contract and actual conditions); 
Pacific Alaska Contractors, Inc. v. U.S., 436 F.2d 461, 864-65 (Cl. Ct. 1971) (to obtain 
equitable adjustment, the contractor must show "indications which induced 
reasonable reliance" on the subsurface conditions in the contract). But Build is 
not attempting to obtain payment for extra work because UDOT' s plans were 
misleading or incorrect, but because UDOT' s engineer made a knowing and 
deliberate change, per the contract. Aside from not being Utah law, the elements 
of a changed condition claim in the Court of Claims opinions relied upon by 
UDOT are not instructive or relevant to the contract interpretation question at 
issue here. 
8 
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characterizes these provisions as "merely suggest[ing] the possibility that Build 
may be able to waste material on site but would not necessarily be able to do so." 
(Id. at 55.) Therefore, in UDOT's opinion, hauling the waste material off-site was 
within the scope of the contract as a matter of law. 
This argument is raised for the first time by UDOT in the response brief 
filed with this court. It was not raised before Judge Harris and Judge Harris 
made no ruling regarding whether the hauling of waste material off-site was 
within the scope of the contract as a matter of law. (See R.11622-637,14657-683, 
15784-85.) Rather, Judge Harris granted summary judgment because he found 
that there was no dispute of fact regarding Mr. Harrison's belief. (R.15785.) 
Indeed, all of the analysis of the district court focused on Mr. Harrison's belief 
about the work. If UDOT' s new position about the meaning of the contract were 
correct-and had been raised-it would have rendered superfluous the district 
court's analysis of Mr. Harrison's mental state. UDOT itself points this out when 
it says: "[t]he material and dispositive fact is that Mr. Harrison believed that off-
site disposal of material was not a change to or alteration of the contract. 
Whether Mr. Harrison was mistaken in his belief is not material." (UDOT Resp. 
Br. at 51-52.) 
The scope of the work contemplated by the contract is a matter of contract 
interpretation, a question which has not been addressed by the district court. 
(R.15784-85.) "A contract's interpretation may be either a question of law, 
9 
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determined by the words of the agreement, or a question of fact, determined by 
extrinsic evidence of intent." Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985). In 
other words, only if the contract language is unambiguous can the question be 
decided as a matter of law. But UDOT does not argue that the language of the 
contract unambiguously states that waste material will be disposed of off-site. 
Nor does UDOT address the conflict between the section it is citing and other 
sections which state that the fill slopes on-site would take the waste material. 
(R.854, 3114, 3117, 1331 (Op. Br. at Add. C-D).) UDOT instead relies on an edited 
quote from the contract to make an ad hoc argument that attempts to circumvent 
the question of Rex Harrison's belief. (UDOT Resp. Br. at 55.) 
On the merits, the section cited by UDOT in support of the argument that 
hauling waste off-site is within the scope of the contract describes disposal both 
on- and off-site but does not dictate which of those is required by the contract. 
(R.5041.) The relevant language from the section cited by UDOT, Section 02231, 
states: 
3.4 DISPOSAL 
A. Dispose of material in accordance with Section 01355. 
B. Do not dispose of material within the designated 
roadbed. 
C. Outside of the right-of-way: 
1. Acceptable when done according to prevailing laws 
(including environmental laws), ordinances, 
regulations, and rules, and at no additional cost 
to the Department. 
10 
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2. Furnish the Engineer with copies of the disposal 
permits or agreements. 
D. Inside the right-of-way: 
1. Bury material at locations specified by or 
acceptable to the Engineer. 
2. Use material to widen embankments and flatten 
embankment side slopes as approved by the 
Engineer .... 
(Id., attached at Add.Hat 3 (emphasis added).) 
First, UDOT misreads Section 02231 in stating that the section 
"contemplates that off-site disposal" will be done at no cost to UDOT. (UDOT 
Resp. Br. at 55) Instead, the contract states that off-site disposal is acceptable only 
when it can be done in accordance with laws and at no additional cost to UDOT. 
(R.5041.) This cuts against UDOT' s argument that requesting Build to haul the 
material off-site was within the scope of the contract because that could not be 
done at no cost to the UDOT and therefore was not "acceptable" under this 
provision of the contract. 
Second, Section 02231 merely provides conditions that trigger on- or off-
1.@ site disposal and the procedures to be followed- it does not inform the reader as 
to what or how much on- or off-site disposal is within the scope of the contract 
and therefore included within the bid price. That is done in Section 00725, titled 
"Scope of Work" and in the Arcadia Project Plans, which Build attached to its 
opening brief. (See Op. Br. at Add. B- D.) These sections of the contract prescribe 
that the waste material can be used to fill the slopes on the plans - a condition 
11 
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that changed after a landslide was discovered in the area, leading Mr. Harrison 
to take the precaution of having the material hauled off-site. (R.854,3114, 3117, 
3503,3511-12.) 
Under UDOT' s contract interpretation, if both Section 02231 and the 
provisions describing placing the waste material on-site dictate the scope of work 
under the contract, then they are in conflict. This cannot be the intent of the 
parties. At the very least, the language cited to by UDOT is ambiguous as to the 
scope of work required by the contract and therefore makes the contract's 
interpretation a question of fact, not of law. Hence, under the contract's terms, 
the belief of Mr. Harrison is material and his subjective state of mind is factually 
in dispute. 
2. The Coordinate Judge Rule Does Apply To Judge Harris's Ruling and 
Judge Harris Did Not Correct an Error in Judge Kennedy's Ruling 
UDOT advances three reasons why the coordinate judge rule does not 
prevent Judge Harris from overruling Judge Kennedy. First, UDOT argues that 
the coordinate judge rule does not apply to interlocutory orders. (UDOT Resp. 
Br. at43-46.) Second, UDOT argues that law of the case, generally, does not 
apply to district court decisions prior to appeal and therefore any district court 
judge may overrule a previous judge sua sponte. (Clyde-Geneva Resp. Br. at 
32,35-41.) Third, UDOT argues that, even if the coordinate judge rule does apply, 
Judge Harris's ruling fell within an exception to that rule because he was 
correcting an error in Judge Kennedy's ruling. (UDOT Resp. Br. at 46-48.) 
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None of UDOT's arguments are preserved. But even if this court treats 
them as adequate alternative grounds on the record, UDOT is incorrect in 
substance as well. The coordinate judge rule remains consistent with Utah case 
law and Judge Harris identified no error that would qualify his ruling for an 
exception to the coordinate judge rule. 
2.1 UDOT's arguments regarding the coordinate judge rule are not 
preserved 
Before Judge Harris, UDOT argued only that the coordinate judge rule did 
not apply because, as UDOT put it to Judge Harris, "UDOT is not asking the 
Court to overrule Judge Kennedy but is instead asking the Court to clarify issues 
that Uudge Kennedy's] Order did not address." (R.14668.) UDOT now argues the 
opposite: that Judge Harris did properly reconsider Judge Kennedy's ruling and 
that the coordinate judge rule does not apply to either interlocutory orders or 
decisions before appeal-neither of which was argued below. (UDOT Resp. Br. at 
43-48; Clyde-Geneva Resp. Br. at 35-41.) UDOT is not just relying on additional 
case law; it is advancing a new substantive legal theory, rather than a procedural 
one, as to why the coordinate judge rule does not apply. 
UDOT argued below that, in the alternative, even if the coordinate judge 
rule did apply, it fell into the error exception because Judge Kennedy erred by 
failing "to rule on the [unaddressed] legal issues and to specify the material facts 
which are disputed." (R.14669.) UDOT now takes a different tack and argues, in 
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vague terms, that Judge Kennedy erred in his application of Meadow Valley. 
(UDOT Resp. Br. at 47.). 
2.2 Mid-America and McLaughlin did not overrule Sittner' s 
articulation of the coordinate judge rule 
The coordinate judge rule is long-standing and has never been overruled 
by the Utah Supreme Court. See USA Power, LLC v. Pacificorp, 2016 UT 20, ,r 38, 
372 P.3d 629 (adopting the coordinate judge rule from AMS Salt Indus., Inc. v. 
Magnesium Corp. of Am., 942 P.2d 315,319 (Utah 1997)). Yet UDOT maintains that 
the coordinate judge rule no longer applies to interlocutory orders and that a 
district court judge can overrule another district court judge at his or her 
discretion-making the coordinate judge indistinguishable from general law of 
the case doctrine. (UDOT Resp. Br. at 43-48; Clyde-Geneva Resp. Br. at 35-41.) 
This is at odds with the supreme court's latest pronouncement on the issue in 
USA Power and thirty years of Utah precedent. 
Admittedly, there has been some inconsistency in the supreme court's 
application of the coordinate judge rule, but it is clear that the rule, as first 
articulated in Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil, Inc., 692 P.2d 735 (Utah 1985) 
and affirmed in several subsequent opinions, including the 2016 USA Power 
decision, is still good law. To understand the current status of the coordinate 
judge rule, it is necessary to examine the development of two lines of Utah case 
law pertinent to the issue. 
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The Sittner line - In Sittner, the court was presented with a procedural 
question nearly identical to the situation here. Sittner moved for summary 
judgment, looking to hold nine defendants liable under a prior judgment. Id. at 
736. The motion was denied as to all defendants by a first judge. Id. The case was 
reassigned to a second judge and Sittner again moved for summary judgment 
with respect to five of the previous defendants. Id. The second judge granted the 
motion and the five defendants appealed, arguing that the "[second] judge erred 
because he overruled a decision by a coequal." Id. 
The Sittner court agreed, elaborating on the preexisting rule that "one 
judge of the same court cannot properly overrule the decision of another judge in 
the same case." Id. (quoting Richardson v. Grand Central Corp., 572 P.2d 395,397 
(Utah 1977)). The Sittner court then referred to several exceptions to the rule, but 
found none to be satisfied after analyzing the only possibly pertinent exception, 
one which applies when a second motion is presented in "a different light." Id. 
The court also described the broader policy behind the coordinate judge rule: "to 
avoid the delays and difficulties that arise when one judge is presented with an 
issue identical to the one which has already been passed upon by a coordinate 
judge in the same case." Id. 
In Mascaro v. Davis, the court reinforced the Sittner holding and reversed a 
grant of a motion to set aside default judgment by a second judge when the same 
had already been denied by a previous judge. 741 P.2d 938, 946-47 (Utah 1987). 
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Citing Sittner and seven other Utah Supreme Court opinions, the Mascaro court 
stated that the court has "repeatedly indicated that one district court judge 
cannot overrule another district court judge of equal authority" and reiterated 
the Sittner policy for the rule. Id. at 946-47. The court also held that the rule is 
consistent with Utah Code section 78-7-19 (now codified as section 78A-2-226(1)) 
which forbids parties from mal<lng a "subsequent application for the same 
order" when that order has already been "refused in whole or in part or is 
granted conditionally." Id. (citing Utah Code§ 78-7-19). 
Several opinions followed in the same vein. State v. Lamper restated the 
Sittner rule, applying the exception that II a second judge may then reexamine an 
earlier ruling" if there has been "a change in the governing law." 779 P.2d 1125, 
1129 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added). The court in AMS Salt Industries, citing 
Mascaro, held that a second judge's grant of summary judgment, overruling a 
partial summary judgment ruling of a prior judge, was within the 11 ~ifferent 
light" exception to the coordinate judge rule as stated by Sittner. 942 P.2d at 319. 
And, in Red Flame, Inc. v. Martinez, the court again restated the Sittner rule, 
explan:ung that while "[i]t is not that the second judge lacks power to revisit an 
earlier judge's ruling ... [rather] there are circumstances where that power 
should not be exercised." 2000 UT 22, 1 4, 996 P.2d 540. As examples of when a 
second judge can revisit an earlier ruling, the court listed the two existing 
exceptions to the coordinate judge rule- presenting the issues in "a different 
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light" and a change in governing law-and articulated a third exception for 
when the first judge's ruling is "clearly erroneous." Id. ,r,r 4-5. Many of these 
opinions were situations where, like Sittner, the second trial court judge had 
overruled the first trial court judge on an interlocutory order, yet the coordinate 
judge rule applied. The rule, and its exceptions, therefore applies equally to 
interlocutory and final orders. 
The Mid-America line - UDOT suggests that Mid-America and McLaughlin, 
decided by the supreme court in 2009 and 2013, abrogated the Sittner coordinate 
judge rule sub silentio, or otherwise made the rule co-extensive with general law 
of the case doctrine. While it appears that the Mid-America court either did not 
apply the coordinate judge rule or inadvertently viewed the coordinate judge 
rule as coextensive with the law of the case doctrine, both Mid-America and 
McLaughlin rely almost entirely on IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D & K Management, 
2008 UT 73,196 P.3d 588, for their discussion of the law of the case doctrine. Mid-
America, 2009 UT 43, ,r,r 11-15; McLaughlin, 2013 UT 20, ,r,r 21-24. The problem 
with this reliance is thatIHC did not apply or discuss the coordinate judge rule 
because there was only one trial court judge for the orders at issue. IHC, 2008 UT 
73, ,r,r 10-13. The court in IHC was applying general law of the case doctrine, not 
the coordinate judge rule. Id. ,r,r 24-37. The IHC court then interpreted the trial 
court's discretion under law of the case doctrine in light of rule 54(b). Id. ,r 27. 
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Mid-America adopts the rule 54(b) language from IHC wholesale and 
applies the general law of the case doctrine to a factual circumstance that 
involved coordinate judges. And it did so without any discussion of Sittner or the 
opinions following Sittner. Mid-America, 2009 UT 43, ,r,r 11-15. The Mid-America 
court ruled that the appellants were attempting to "invert[] the law by 
suggesting that law of the case doctrine prevents a district court from 
reconsidering a resolved issue." Id. ,r 11. In so holding, Mid-America blurred the 
distinction between the law the case doctrine, generally, and the more specific 
coordinate judge rule. McLaughlin followed the Mid-America/ IHC reasoning 
under similar circumstances. McLaughlin, 2013 UT 20, ,r,r 21-24. 
USA Power reaffirms the Sittner line - If Mid-America or McLaughlin was 
the last supreme court opinion to address the coordinate judge rule, UDOT's 
argument might have merit. But they are not. USA Power is the supreme court's 
most recent pronouncement on the coordinate judge rule and it firmly 
reestablished the existence of the rule as articulated in Sittner. 
UDOT is correct that the factual circumstance in USA Power is not 
analogous to the situation here. However, Build is not relying on USA Power for 
the proposition that the coordinate judge rule applies to this case, but only for 
the proposition that the Sittner line of opinions is still good law. USA Power states 
that "when a trial court judge reviews another trial court judge's ruling, the 
doctrine prevents the second judge from overruling the first." 2016 UT 20, ,r 38 
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(citing AMS, 942 P.2d 315, 319.) The "doctrine" the court is referring to is "a 
standard used in another branch of law of the case doctrine," otherwise known 
as the coordinate judge rule. Id. USA Power actually expands the application of 
the coordinate judge rule and its exceptions. The court reasoned that the rule not 
only applies to two trial court judges, but found this rule .uto also be appropriate 
in the context of a trial court's review of factual issues decided by an appellate 
court." Id. USA Power cites only opinions in the Sittner line in its analysis. Id. ,r 38 
n.23-24 & 26-27 (citing AMS, 942 P.2d 315, 319, for the coordinate judge rule and 
"different light" exception and Red Flame, 2000 UT 22, ,r ,r 4-5, for when the 
"different light" exception is satisfied). 
The more specific coordinate judge rule under Sittner does exactly what 
Mid-America reasoned the general law of the case doctrine does not do- it 
"inverts" law of the case to limit a coordinate judge's discretion to overrule a 
previous judge to certain factual circumstances. 692 P.2d at 736. Otherwise the 
purpose of the coordinate judge rule- to "avoid the delays and difficulties" of 
rehashing an issue identical to one already ruled on by another judge- is 
completely frustrated and the coordinate judge rule is indistinguishable from 
law of the case doctrine generally, rather than functioning as a more specific 
"branch" of law of the case. Id.; USA Power, 2016 UT 20, ,r 38. 
If this court relies on the opinions that specifically address the coordinate 
judge rule- the line of opinions originating from Sittner and reaffirmed in USA 
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Power- there is no need to reconcile this case with the Mid-America line that 
applies the more general law of the case doctrine. And on its facts, the coordinate 
judge rule clearly applies to Judge Harris' s overruling of Judge Kennedy's 
decision on the exact same issues. 
2.3 Judge Harris' s ruling does not fall into the "error" exception to the 
coordinate judge rule 
In the alternative, UDOT argues that, even if the coordinate judge rule 
does apply, Judge Harris was correcting an error in Judge Kennedy's ruling-an 
exception to the coordinate judge rule. (UDOT Resp. Br. at 43.) This exception to 
the coordinate judge rule comes from the supreme court's decision in Red Flame, 
Inc. v. Martinez, 2000 UT 22, 996 P.2d 540. There, the court held that" although the 
factual and legal posture of the case has not changed" a second judge may 
overrule a first judge if "it appears to the second judge that the first ruling was 
clearly erroneous and will infect subsequent proceedings with error." Id. ,r 5. The 
court has not defined on this exception further but, under the general law of the 
case doctrine, a similar exception has been defined as one in which the prior 
decision "was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice." Gildea v. 
Guardian Title Co., 2001 UT 75, ,I 9, 31 P.3d 543. 
The supreme court has interpreted manifest injustice to be synonymous 
with plain error. Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, ,r 61, 130 P.3d 325; Crookston v. Fire 
Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991). "The plain error test has three parts: the 
demonstration of error; a qualitative showing that the error was plain, manifest, 
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or obvious to the trial court; and evidence that the error affected the substantial 
rights of a party." Jensen, 2005 UT 81, ,r 61; State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, ,r,r 42-50, 
82 P.3d 1106. 
Neither UDOT nor Judge Harris identify or demonstrate the existence of 
plain error in Judge Kennedy's decision. UDOT now argues that the error was 
Judge Kennedy's misapplication of Meadow Valley. (UDOT Resp. Br. at47.) Any 
such error is far from "plain". Because UDOT did not even argue to Judge Harris 
that Judge Kennedy misapplied Meadow Valley before Judge Harris, and Judge 
Harris made no specific finding about how Judge Kennedy misapplied Meadow 
Valley, it is difficult to see how the error could be obvious. UDOT relies on 
equivocal statements from Judge Harris during the hearing where he admits not 
understanding how Judge Kennedy "distinguished" Meadow Valley. (Id.) This is 
not an identification of obvious error, it is the opposite. Judge Harris 
acknowledged this himself when he stated that "Judge Kennedy heard all of this, 
he was the judge, the trial judge in Meadow Valley and he probably should have 
caught this if it was an error to be caught." (R.16387 (emphasis added)). This is not 
an identification of a plain error, it is an expression of doubt that any error has 
been made. 
This is why the coordinate judge rule should apply. Judge Kennedy 
believed that Build' s evidence was sufficient to support its claims at trial and was 
well aware of the controlling legal standard, Meadow Valley, when he made that 
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decision. Allowing a second judge to overrule that decision, without any 
indication that Judge Kennedy erred or was somehow otherwise unable to make 
a correct decision on summary judgment, delays and frustrates judicial economy 
and consistency. And as noted above, there is no reason to think that Judge 
Kennedy misapplied Meadow Valley. 
3. Judge Harris Erred in Dismissing Build's Consequential Damages Claim 
Without a Dispositive Motion 
There are two errors arising from Judge Harris' s dismissal of Build' s 
consequential damages claim. First, Judge Harris did so without authority. 
Second, Judge Harris did not allow Build to provide, let alone consider, other 
evidence for the business valuation or other types of consequential damages. 
UDOT asserts that Judge Harris had the authority to dismiss Build' s claim 
under the district court's "own inherent power" to dismiss claims in granting a 
motion in limine. (UDOT Resp. Br. at 57-59.) But Utah law says the opposite. 
Fisher v. Davidhizar, 2011 UT App 270, ,r 14 & n. 11, 263 P.3d 440. 
Assuming the district court had authority to treat the motion in limine as a . 
dispositive motion, UDOT asserts that Build cannot prove consequential 
damages. But UDOT ignores the fact that Build can, at the very least, prove the 
amount of its attorney fees, and, at most, can provide different evidence of the 
value of its business. (UDOT Resp. Br. at 60-61.) 
Finally, UDOT asserts that Build did not preserve its claims for attorney 
fees as consequential damages. (UDOT Resp. Br. at 62-63; Clyde-Geneva Resp. 
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Br. at 48-55.) But UDOT fails to mention not only that a party need not provide 
other evidence to support a claim in opposing a motion in limine, but also that 
UDOT acknowledged in its original summary judgment papers that Build' s 
downfall could be attributed to its incurring attorney fees-a type of 
consequential damages. 
3.1 A trial court cannot sua sponte dismiss claims without a 
dispositive motion because it prejudices the party whose claims 
are dismissed 
UDOT argues that a district court may "dismiss a meritless claim sua 
sponte under Rule (12)(b)(6), Rule 41, or simply under its own inherent power." 
(UDOT Resp. Br. at 57. Rule 12 is not at issue here and Rule 41 does not allow a 
district court to dismiss for lack of evidence, but only for failure of the plaintiff 
J'/to prosecute or to comply with the[] rules." Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b). That leaves 
UDOT' s broad statement that the district court can dismiss claims, without any 
dispositive motion pending, under "its own inherent power," which has no 
support in Utah law support. 
UDOT cites a number of opinions from federal courts and other 
jurisdictions to support this claim but admits that "Utah appellate cases have not 
directly addressed district court's inherent power to dismiss an unmeritorious 
claim." (UDOT Resp. Br. at 57.) The federal opinions upon which UDOT relies 
are either considering district court dismissals under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6) or under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which allows a district court to 
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dismiss an indigent plaintiff's frivolous claim sua sponte. Fitzgerald v. First E. 
Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2nd Cir. 2000) (holding that 
district courts can dismiss frivolous claims that would have been dismissed 
under section 1915(e)(2)).Those opinions have no application here. 
Nor are the federal opinions analogous to a circumstance where there has 
been extensive discovery and litigation and a district court attempts to dismiss 
claims summarily after excluding evidence but without a pending dispositive 
motion. In fact, Utah law disapproves of just such a practice. In Fisher v. 
Davidhizar, this court reversed a trial court's decision to treat a non-dispositive 
motion in limine as dispositive, particularly after the dispositive motion deadline 
had passed. 2011 UT App 270, ,r 14 & n. 11, 263 P.3d 440. Similarly, in Osburn v. 
Bott, this court reversed a trial court's decision to summarily dismiss a petition 
for a civil stalking injunction without notice or an opportunity to respond 
because "the appearance of unfairness" was "plain." 2011 UT App 138, ,r 8,257 
P.3d 1028 (internal citations omitted). That is precisely what occurred here. 
3.2 Dismissing claims sua sponte prejudices Build because Build was 
not able to present evidence or preserve its argument for appeal 
In dismissing Build's claims sua sponte after excluding the testimony of two 
witnesses for different reasons, the trial court deprived Build of the opportunity 
to respond to the potential dismissal of its claims, namely, to present the court 
with other evidence of consequential damages. UDOT asserts that the court 
properly deprived Build of the opportunity to provide other evidence because 
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Build had not provided other evidence in opposing the motion in limine. (UDOT 
Resp. Br. at 59.) Depriving a party of the opportunity to present evidence cannot 
be appropriate because the party did not present that evidence. 
Nor is this "bad policy," as UDOT claims, unless due process concerns are 
bad policy. The alternative is to allow parties to file motions in limine to exclude 
evidence- after the dispositive motion deadline- and encourage the trial court 
to dismiss sua sponte without allowing the opposing party to respond or preserve 
arguments. UDOT cannot wait until long after the dispositive motion deadline to 
file its motions in limine, only to have them treated as dispositive motions. 
In Build' s response to the motions in limine, it did not describe other 
evidence of consequential damages - such as what other witness may be able to 
provide or attorney fees - because marshaling additional evidence had nothing 
to do with the exclusion of the witness testimony. As one example, Build could 
have used statements regarding litigation expenses made by Build's CEO, Kevin 
Nilsen. (R.7243-74,7249,7251-53.) Build has evidence of consequential damages: 
the over half a million dollars in attorney fees that Build has had to pay as a 
result of litigation over UDOT's breach of contract. (R.7243-74,7249,7251-53.) 
And depriving Build of the opportunity to present the trial court with 
additional evidence of consequential damages was prejudicial. Judge Harris 
erred in summarily dismissing Build' s· claims for consequential damages sua 
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sponte after excluding only two types of evidence for one type of consequential 
damages. 
3.3 Build' s claim for attorney fees is preserved below 
UDOT argues that Build' s attorney fees claim is not preserved. (UDOT 
Resp. Br. at 62-63; Clyde-Geneva Resp. Br. at 48-55.) But UDOT' sown filings 
acknowledge that Build's litigation expenses were "the culprit" in Build's 
demise. (R.7172-73.) Furthermore, had Build been given the opportunity to 
respond to a properly brought and framed dispositive motion for summary 
judgment on its consequential damages claims, it would have included the 
evidence of attorney fees under the third-party tort rule in its response, thus 
preserving its argument for appeal. Build' s evidence for attorney fees and the 
lack of opportunity to preserve its argument on appeal are discussed further in 
the follow sections. 
Conclusion 
This court should reverse Judge Harris' s dismissal of Build' s breach of 
contract and consequential damages claims. 
DATED this 23rd day of December, 2016. 
ZIMMERMAN JONES BOOHER 
~= 
Troy L. Booher 
Beth E. Kennedy 
Alexandra Mareschal 
Attorneys for Appellant Build Inc. 
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SECTION 02231 
SITE CLEARING AND GRUBBING 
PARTl GENERAL 
1.1 SECTION INCLUDES 
A Clear, grub, remove and dispose of trees, stumps, and debris within the designated 
limits of the roadways, channels, easements, and other designated areas. 
1.2 RELATED SECTIONS 
1.3 
A. Section 01355: Environmental Protection 
B. Section 01571; Temporary Environmental Controls 
C. Section 02221: Remove Structure and Obstruction 
DEFINITIONS 
A. Clear: remove and dispose of trees, stumps, logs, limbs, sticks, vegetation, debris, 
and other material on the natural ground suiface. 
B. Grub: remove and dispose of roots, buried logs, debris, and other material under 
the ground surface. 
t.4 PAYl\'ffiNT PROCEDURES 
A. 
PART2 
\vnen there is no bid item included in the proposal for £'Site Clearing and 
Grubbing:" 
1. This work is considered incidental to other items of work and no separate 
measurement or payment will be made. 
2. Include all costs in other items of work. 
PRODUCTS Not used 
Site Clearing and Grubbing 
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PART3 EXECUTION 
3.1 PREPARATION 
3.2 
3.3 
A. 
B. 
C. 
Verify with Engiqcer the vegetation or objects to be removed 
Review work procedures with Engineer. 
Schedule work carefully v..ith consideration for property owners and general 
public. 
D. Refer to Section 01571 for temporary environmental measures. 
VEGETA'fION REMOVAL 
A 
B. 
C. 
Grub the areas 2 feet below natural ground ·within the limits of clearing of all 
stumps, roots, buried logs, and all other underground obstructions. 
Stumps, roots7 and non-perishable solid objects may remain in cleared areas 
where the embanlanent is: 
l. 2.0 feet or more above the natnral groun~ 
2. At least 2.0 feet away·outsidc the slope stake lines. 
Completely grub $lumps and roots where a structure is to be constructed,. piles are 
to be driven, or unsuitable material is to be removed. 
BACKFILLING 
A. Backfill a.11 stump holes, cuts, depressions, and other holes resulting from clearing 
and grubbing within areas to receive embankment Compact backfilled areas to 
the density of the surrounding ground. 
B. Measure and pay separately for materials used for backfilling under "Roadway 
Excavation" or"Borrow.'' · 
C. Consider ~'Roadway Excavation" and ~'Borrow" as incidental to the wotk when 
these items are not included in the bid proposal. No separate measurement or 
payment made in this case. 
Site Clearing and Grubbing 
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3.4 DISPOSAL 
3.5 
3.6 
A. 
B. 
C. 
Dispose of material in accormmce with Section 01355. 
Do not dispose of material within the designated roadbed. 
Outside of the right-of-way: 
1. Acceptable when done according to prevailingla'\1t'S (including 
enviro?Jl]ental ~aws):,. ordinances, regulations, and rules, and at no 
additional cost to the Department 
2. Furnish the Engineer with copies of the disposal permits or agreements. 
D. Inside the right--of-way; 
1. Bury material at locations specilied by or acceptable to the Engineer. 
2. Use material lo ~iden embankments and flatten embankment side slopes 
as approved by the Engineer. 
3. Cover dispo~·ed material with a minimum of 20 ft of earth and grade to 
drain properly at no additional cost to the Department 
4. Reduce wood to chips a ma.·1dmum of ½ inch thick for mulching cut and 
fill slopes. Chips may be buried or distributed un:if ormly on the ground 
surface and mixed \\ith the underlying earth so the mi'itures will not 
sustain burning. 
TREE REMOVAL 
A. Refer to Seotion 02221. 
PROTECTION 
A. 
B. 
C. 
Land monuments, property markers, or official datum points: 
I. Protect until their r~ oval is approved. 
2. Reference for re-establishment before removing. 
Protect trec-$.from damage to roots and branches if tbey are designated to remain. 
Protect otl1ervegetation and/or objects designated to remain. 
END OF SECTION 
Site Clearing and Grubbing 
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